The Epistemological Evaluation of Oppositional Secrets * I keep secrets. Even though I am told over and over by white feminists that we must reveal ourselves, open ourselves, I keep secrets. Disclosing our secrets threatens our survival. (Lugones, 2003, 11) Postcolonial and other oppositional literature introduces many readers to secrets from the social margins, sometimes only mentioning them, sometimes sharing their content. Moving beyond colonialism and other forms of oppression is as much a goal as a description of this writing. Because survival may be threatened, the question arises in what circumstances feminists should expect the secrets of oppressed people to be shared, and so in what circumstances we should investigate or reveal them. This issue seems to confound the central claim of standpoint epistemologists -postcolonial, feminist, or otherwise -that there is cognitive value in learning from people's experiences of oppression (Harding 1991; Hartsock 1986 , Mills 1998 ). Whether or not one shares similar experiences, standpoint theorists argue, to begin thought from the perspective of "others" and "other 'others'", as Sandra Harding (1991) puts it, provides an epistemic advantage. Secrets concerned with resistance, such as in the Underground Railroad, women's shelters and lesbian passing, must be especially valuable and relevant to developing knowledge from a standpoint, because activism is supposed to be necessary to acquire the advantage. Yet, revealing aspects of resistance so vulnerable that they are kept secret risks undermining the potential of those secrets for resisting and opposing oppression. Thus, the epistemological value of oppositional secrecy seems to conflict with standpoint theorists' advice of emancipatory activism.
The case of oppositional secrecy seems to indicate an exception to standpoint theory, a case in which emancipatory politics does not encourage but prohibits sharing understanding. However, as I will argue, the need to preserve oppositional secrecy is not an exception to, but only a limited case of, standpoint epistemology. Some understanding that might be gained is not barred by political considerations, but political distinctions do indicate when and where the cognitive value of such understandings tapers off. The cognitive significance of exposing hidden understanding reduces in cases of extreme political vulnerability that morally require secrecy.
Standpoint Knowledge
Cognitive value arises from a standpoint in two different ways. The first is from accessing suppressed knowledge, understandings that people in power or systems of power currently obscure. Bringing a view from the social margins to the attention of epistemic agents beyond the oppressed group moves it into spheres where it can be of benefit to, and where it can benefit from, engaging with mainstream intellectual resources. More original (in a literal sense) to marginalized perspectives is the second form, underdeveloped knowledge, including tacit understanding and practical wisdom.
Underdeveloped understandings must initially provide benefit to, and be developed by, people who experience a common form of oppression. Only once appreciated as shared aspects of life can tacit understandings and practical wisdom become transferable knowledge. At that point, coalition and exchange with other communities becomes possible that is both politically directed and epistemologically fruitful (at least if not suppressed).
Both suppressed and underdeveloped knowledge provide special cognitive value only insofar as they are based on experiences of people in oppressed groups that tend to be difficult to access. Because of oppression, people in some groups do not have access to resources that facilitate individuals' learning, such as books or a decent breakfast. Moreover, isolated individuals won't develop strong communal perspectives. Isolation from others who share experiences of the same form of oppression makes experiences of marginalization seem idiosyncratic, or personal rather than political. This applies directly to women, gay men, and especially lesbians, because compound oppressions tend to compound isolation. Therefore, a communal perspective may require consciousness-raising and separatism. Indirectly, but no less powerfully, some forms of oppression isolate people from each other by restricting education and literacy, and so limiting the ability to share experience and understanding. Articulating the common nature of experiences of oppression not only reveals the breadth of an experienced phenomenon, such as sexual harassment or racial violence; it also reveals the contingent political situation that obscures those experiences. So, resisting oppression provides political wisdom, and Blacks learn from Blacks, women from women, and lesbians from lesbians. Also, single straight women and lesbians learn from each other about the privilege of heterosexual monogamy and how it fosters sexism; Latino/as, Native North Americans, and Blacks learn from each other about racism, and so on.
However, even unified perspectives may be suppressed. Actively seeking out marginalized views is necessary for bringing together all potential approaches. Africanists may learn from feminists, lesbians may learn from Quebecois francophones, and iconic straight White heterosexual Western ablebodied men may learn from us all. Only less can be learned from the political center, because people in that situation already receive a disproportionate amount of attention.
The development for political reasons of views from the social margins has a distinctively epistemological result because it encourages effective egalitarian social sharing of information (Harding 1991 Learning from a range of positions (social or ideological) is cognitively valuable in order to counteract people's stubbornness and science's undemocratic tendencies.
Working against the underdevelopment and suppression of views from the social margins requires special attention to these views. This involves affirmative action in the name of stricter cognitive standards. Of course, benefiting the understanding of people in general by developing perspectives from the margins is no straightforward matter. In addition to the general problems of moving "from margin to center," particular situations of political oppression and corresponding cognitive resources require particularized accounts. Nevertheless, in general, knowledge improves when addressed to the interests of people on the social margins, and reflects their concerns and problems that otherwise tend to be sidelined or remain isolated. In this way, for instance, as Patricia Hill Collins argues, insider-outsiders, who resist a particular form of oppression but who have some access to the authority of the political center, help create better sociology (1991). i
Oppositional Secrecy
The very nature of secrecy makes it difficult to find examples -and so much the worse because suppression and underdevelopment make understanding from an oppressed perspective difficult to recognize. However, even a thoroughly privileged Western feminist can discern two forms of oppositional secrecy. First, oppressed people build covert networks to escape or mitigate oppression, as in the case of the Underground Railroad or illegal systems providing contraceptive information and services. Second, people belonging to an oppressed group may "pass" as having a more politically central identity. For instance, Blacks may pass as White, or gays and lesbians pass as straight; indeed, all sorts of passing is possible through marriage and name-changes.
These two types of oppositional secrecy take special forms. For instance, a casual form of secret arises when people covertly share information by using a language different from the politically dominant tongue. Francophones in English Canada and Latino/as in the U.S. occasionally make use of this tool for secrecy, and we can consider it an ad hoc networking provision, an Underground Railroad in microcosm. The goal is to secure safe passage, not of whole people or physical provisions, but of information alone, just as some birth control networks provide.
Some oppositional secrets combine the two strategies of passing and networking. Passing as a typical house or generic institution may be important for a women's shelter, but this requires a network of support by volunteers, and strict privacy policies that keep the shelter beyond easy access by abusers; all this together makes it possible for residents to hide their identities. (More completely covert networks may be necessary for highly endangered clients.)
Likewise, same-sex couples in the United States seeking access to marriage may use networks to provide temporary addresses and pass as residents of states that provide access to legal marriage; and in Japan they may pass as parent and child to gain access to the property rights otherwise afforded to couples (Maree 2004 ).
Another hybrid of passing and networking that disrupts oppression is secret sabotage, including feigned helplessness, an underground activity that depends on passing. A slave who intentionally damages farm machinery to provide another slave time to recuperate from an illness wishes to pass as a dutiful slave but also to negotiate systematic reprieve for the other (Douglas 1995) . Appearing dutiful is also necessary for the mother who intentionally asks nonsensical questions, or burns dinner and breaks dishes. Her behavior provides reprieve from the indignity that can infect motherwork, a reprieve provided by demonstrating to herself her own measure of independence (Lugones 2003, 5-6) .
The effects of secrecy vary according to context and are difficult to predict. What is meant to be oppositional may instead be collaborative, and generally involves both. Any oppositional activity is likely to be "curdled", that is both blended with repressive aspects, and ambiguous in the face of interlocking oppressions (Lugones 1994; 2003, 8-16) . On the oppositional side, consider how passing tends be more useful for lesbians than gay men who may confront heterosexism without the complications of sexism (Card 1995 ). Yet, for lesbians, passing entails a special risk of collaboration: the invisibility of lesbian identity encourages neglect of lesbian issues and dismissal of specific lesbian concerns as merely personal or at best marginal and insignificant.
Thus, lesbian invisibility can perpetuate lesbians' minority status; indeed, any case of passing can perpetuate servility to the dominant culture, and so undermine personal dignity (Card 1995, 120) . So, the strategy of passing is easily corrupted. Note how passing as White is fraught for African-Americans seeking the benefits of skin privilege, who may therefore perceive themselves and be perceived by others as traitors.
Unintentional collaboration in oppressive systems is less a danger for deliberate underground avenues of resistance. Admittedly, a casual linguistic secret or underground network depends on those in power being substantially ignorant, and ignorance of marginalized lives can be a source of oppression. ii
The occupation of separate physical and linguistic domains may support oppressive social systems. Yet, employing the marginalized environment as an avenue for resistance need not validate the system of privilege in the same way or to nearly the same degree as acquiring the privileges of the political center by passing. The ignorance that makes possible underground networks does not directly create the oppressive environment. In no immediate sense does a slave-owner's ignorance of survival means in the wild oppress the slaves, or a Canadian anglophone's ignorance of the French language oppress francophones. iii However, collaboration may result indirectly from even the most pointed of oppositional actions, and thus to hidden emancipatory networks. The success of the Underground Railroad was double-edged, as warned abolitionist and escaped slave, Frederick Douglas. Of course, some slaves gained hope and abolitionists gained inspiration from hearing of it. However, even the very limited awareness of it available to slave-holders, an awareness that might be dismissed as rumour, could make the slave-holders extra vigilant, and may ultimately have served their interests more than the slaves (Douglas 1995, 60 ).
Despite such frequently ambiguous implications of political secrecy, it certainly can be very effective, and it is not a strategy unique to the oppressed.
Covert networks and disguises also undermine legitimate forms of social control. Still, underground systems of prisoners whose social suppression is politically warranted can be left out of this discussion, at least insofar as we can distinguish between oppression and politically warranted suppression.
Inmates in a prison may find means of sharing drugs and weapons, and for continued illegal and immoral behavior, means that resemble those of Jews in a concentration camp for sharing food and water; yet revealing unjust networks poses no problem for standpoint theory. The relevant difference is not the materials exchanged and particular activities of networks, which only illustrate the contrast with networks mobilized against oppression. What morally distinguishes the cases -or aspects of the cases, as they are curdled -is the purpose for the form of underground network, whether the goal is politically justified. People imprisoned as a result of racist or classist social policies that may, for instance, lead them to steal in order to eat, have oppositional knowledge. Their perspective provides cognitive advantage, productive alternative perspectives. Of course, deference to people who are party more than oneself to the secret only practically postpones the issue of secret revelation, leaving open at least two problems. vi First, in most cases, it is not clear who is an insider to the secret and who an outsider. For instance, one may know that a secret exists on some topic or among some people, but not know other details.
Moreover, being aware of the incompleteness of one's understanding tends to motivate inquiry. Most people faced with decisions about revealing or investigating secrets are both insiders and outsiders: they are insiders insofar as they know at least that there is a secret, even if they have stumbled upon it accidentally; and they are outsiders insofar as they are interested themselves in a deeper understanding of it, or insofar as they are connected with people who don't share but might be interested in it. Second, deference to insiders does not resolve philosophically the issue of how insiders, and partial insiders who are the majority of concerned actors, decide for themselves and for others.
A variety of ethical, pragmatic and social considerations come into play in deciding whether an oppositional secret may be revealed or investigated.
However, whether their significance is greater than the potential for improving the community's knowledge by sharing the secret is a further matter.
From Political to Epistemological Evaluation
Whether to reveal or investigate oppositional secrecy concerns knowledge writ large: not apolitical, timeless, placeless, disembodied knowledge, but the knowledge of marginalized communities as they exist in combination with other communities, that are smaller or larger, and politically central or differently marginalized. People in these other communities are also cognitive beneficiaries of oppositional politics. Admittedly, the ways in which knowledge might serve the oppressed was the original issue for standpoint epistemology (Smith 1974; Harding 1986; . Standpoint theorists contest the ways in which science serves men at the expense of women, for instance by not testing medications on women, and then assuming women respond as men do.
However, an emancipated science benefits not only the oppressed. The community in general is supposed to gain understanding by thinking from the perspective of "others" and "other 'others'" (Rose 1983; Harding 1991) . So, to be justified according to standpoint epistemology, revealing oppositional secrecy should improve the knowledge of all, or perhaps in utilitarian terms, provide the greatest understanding for the greatest number.
Can cognitive advantage to the general community be sufficient to outweigh the political disadvantage of marginalized people losing a strategic secret? Does it make sense to think this way? Weighing cognitive against political values seems like comparing apples with oranges. On the other hand, speaking as if cognition can be wholly separated from and contrasted with political or ethical values not only sounds crass it can only be a heuristic for identifying conflicting interests. Such dichotomies are denied by feminist philosophers of science (Longino 1997; Nelson and Nelson 1995) , and particularly by standpoint theorists (Hartsock 1983; Rose 1983) , who maintain that the cognitive value to accrue from obtaining an oppositional standpoint is always politically dependent. If the secrets are used to resist oppression, the political interests clearly take priority, but it is not clear just how much priority Admittedly, secrecy restricts access to certain information and cognitive skills, detracting from the flow of information that makes multiple perspectives available, and that benefits a community in general. For those who don't share the secret, especially perhaps whom are pointedly deceived -the slaveholders, batterers and homophobes, the withheld wisdom could be very valuable.
Recall, however, that liberatory political commitments are vital to the development of epistemic advantage from a standpoint. It belongs less, for instance, to women or Blacks than to feminists or Africanists. The circumstances of oppression must be problematized to reveal and develop the significance of that perspective for the future and the larger world; experience and testimony are only starting places for reasoning. Novel theories about the workings of the world that may serve to inform the larger community emerge from experiences at the social margins after being refined by scrutiny and discussion among peers (Collins 2001; Wylie 1992) .
What counts as activism appropriate for opposing oppression depends on the judgments and perceived needs of those experiencing that form of oppression, such as slaves, abused women, and lesbians. Their political goals set limits on the cognitive value that might derive from their perspective. Black activism, for instance, can appear to non-Blacks as mere socializing (Collins 2001) . Outsiders' respect for the self-determination of the people they would emancipate and the degree to which they recognize the insiders' purposes restricts the knowledge outsiders might gain.
Only if revealing a secret is expedient in the eyes of those who hold it, is it justified morally, and so justified epistemologically. Just as the epistemological value of a standpoint declines when oppression recedes, it must also decline when a social situation is so politically precarious that knowledge must be hidden, and the fragility of any situation tends to be best judged by those close to it.
Consider how to recognize on cognitive grounds the importance of maintaining the anonymity of women one knows or studies who reside in a shelter. Those details might provide salience to a theory or a belief, or answer a problem. However, the purpose of such a revelation can be only immediately practical; it won't provide the long-term functionality sufficient to consider it cognitively valuable. Fresh scrutiny will face the sabotaging wife should others become aware that there is some secret regarding her behavior. Their watchful eyes will make it difficult for her to continue to act out, and so will amplify the oppression she experiences. Whatever motivation there is for secret understandings, their cognitive value largely depends on how the world is shaped by politics now and in the possible future. The more access abusers have to their victims, the less difference the victims' meager secrets can make, even to the victims themselves, and the less real is the content of those secrets, in both a literal and a psychological sense. It is less possible for gays and lesbians to pass, and so less informative that they do, so long as they are persecuted. The more thoroughgoing and accepted is slavery, the less the Underground Railroad can work to develop and preserve Africans' culture, self-esteem, and individual lives. The knowledge kept secret by people who suffer these forms of oppression is useful and true only to the extent that the world might support the value and the legitimacy of those people's lives, a possibility that is threatened and undermined by oppression. Secrets of the oppressed are meaningful views of the world and have cognitively important consequences especially to the extent that those secrets support an otherwise endangered moral status and provide for political emancipation, which is to say, to the extent that they have morally desirable consequences. Likewise, to the extent that oppositional politics require secrecy on moral grounds, the cognitive returns of revealing those secrets diminish: little is told of the present world.
Conclusion
Oppositional secrecy does not deliver the epistemological dilemma for standpoint theories that it seems to on first glance. Rather, if the present political environment makes secrecy valuable, then there is a substantial threat to the political future protected, but to some extent only projected or viewed as a future possibility, by the secret. Understanding threats to marginalized views of the world is implicit to the political considerations that usually guide decisions about respecting the authority of secret-holders.
Oppositional secrets must be made or kept relevant to the world by initial steps progressing against oppression and toward making an egalitarian future real, in order that the secrets become more than idle hopes and dreams. In such cases, political concerns do not override epistemological concerns, but political circumstances make the epistemological value highly vulnerable.
That epistemology can capture the reasons for preserving oppositional secrets does not imply that cognitive terms should be used for making decisions. To the contrary, because the usual political terms with which we confront oppositional secrets track also cognitive aspects of the issue, we may rest assured that we are not neglecting a full range of human values. Political vulnerabilities that recommend keeping or respecting a secret indicate that the knowledge to be gained is tenuous. So, the political concerns that motivate oppositional secrecy target epistemological implications. Political values have cognitive aspects, just as feminist philosophers of science show that cognitive values have political aspects (Longino 1997; Nelson and Nelson 1995) . 
